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                             OPINION 
                                            
 COWEN, Circuit Judge. 
 
 
     Former Commissioner of the Delaware River Port Authority of 
Pennsylvania and New Jersey ("DRPA"), Max Pievsky, filed a 
complaint challenging the Governor of Pennsylvania's power to 
remove him without cause under the terms of the DRPA Compact, an 
interstate agreement between the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and 
the State of New Jersey.  The district court dismissed the 
complaint on summary judgment, concluding that the Governor of 
Pennsylvania had the power to remove DRPA Commissioners prior to 
the expiration of their terms.  Because we agree that, under the 
terms of the DRPA Compact, the Governor of Pennsylvania has the 
power to remove the appointed DRPA Commissioners at will, we will 
affirm the April 12, 1996 order of the district court. 
 
                                I. 
     Jurisdiction of the district court was invoked pursuant to 
28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 1441(b).  The construction of an interstate 
compact approved by Congress presents a federal question under 28 
U.S.C. § 1331.  See Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 
359 U.S. 275, 278, 79 S. Ct. 785, 788 (1959).  We exercise 
appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.   
     Our review of the district court's interpretation of the 
interstate compact is plenary.  Peters v. Delaware River Port 
Auth., 16 F.3d 1346, 1349 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 62 
(1994). 
 
 
                               II. 
     The parties stipulated to the following facts.  The DRPA 
derives its authority from the DRPA Compact, an interstate 
agreement between the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and the State 
of New Jersey.  The Compact was originally enacted by the 
Pennsylvania and New Jersey legislatures in 1931 and is codified 
in reciprocal statutes at Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 36, § 3503 (1995) 
and N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 32:3-1 to 3-18 (West 1995).  As required 
by the Compact Clause of the United States Constitution, U.S. 
Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 3, Congress originally consented to the 
terms of the Compact in 1932 and thereafter consented to 
amendments in 1952 and 1992.   
     The DRPA was created, among other things, to construct and 
operate bridges across the Delaware River, to construct and 
maintain facilities for the transportation of passengers between 
Pennsylvania and New Jersey, and to improve and develop the ports 
of Philadelphia and Camden.  DRPA Compact, Article I, 36 P.S. § 
3503.  The DRPA has sixteen commissioners, eight of whom are 
appointed from Pennsylvania and eight of whom are appointed from 
New Jersey.  The Compact establishes the procedure for the 
appointment of the eight commissioners from Pennsylvania as 
follows: 
     [s]ix of the eight commissioners for the Commonwealth of 
     Pennsylvania shall be appointed by the Governor of 
     Pennsylvania for terms of five years.  The Auditor General 
     and the State Treasurer of said Commonwealth shall, ex- 
     officio, be commissioners for said Commonwealth, each having 
     the privilege of appointing a representative to serve in his 
     place at any meeting of the commission which he does not 
     attend personally. 
 
          All commissioners shall continue to hold office after 
     the expiration of the terms for which they are appointed or 
     elected until their respective successors are appointed and 
     qualify, but no period during which any commissioner shall 
     hold over shall be deemed to be an extension of his term of 
     office for the purpose of computing the date on which his 
     successor's terms expires. 
 
DRPA Compact, Article II, 36 P.S. § 3503.  Article II of the 
Compact states that the New Jersey appointees must be confirmed 
by the Senate of New Jersey, but does not require legislative 
confirmation of Pennsylvania's appointees. 
     The states have significant control over the DRPA.  The 
Compact provides that the Board may act only by way of a majority 
of each state's commissioners voting in favor of the action.  In 
1992, the state legislatures amended the Compact to allow each 
state to pass legislation authorizing its Governor to veto the 
action of any of the state's commissioners within ten days of 
receipt of the minutes of the meeting at which the vote was 
taken.  
     On December 28, 1994, former Governor of Pennsylvania Robert 
Casey appointed Max Pievsky as a commissioner of the DRPA.  The 
commission, signed by the Governor, states that Pievsky shall 
hold office until December 28, 1999.  On January 22, 1996, 
Pievsky received a telephone call from Leslie Gromis, Director of 
Governor Ridge's Office of Public Liaison.  Gromis informed 
Pievsky that the Governor was disappointed in Pievsky's vote for 
a new chairperson for the DRPA Board on January 17, 1996.  Gromis 
further stated that if Pievsky did not resign the next day, the 
Governor would make an appointment to the DRPA to replace him.     
                               III. 
     On January 23, 1996, Pievsky filed suit in the Commonwealth 
Court of Pennsylvania seeking to enjoin Governor Ridge from 
removing him as a commissioner.  The Governor removed the case to 
the United States District Court for the Middle District of 
Pennsylvania, asserting that Pievsky's claims arise under the 
laws of the United States pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331 and 
1441(b).   
     The district court issued an opinion and entered an order 
denying Pievsky's requests for declaratory judgment and permanent 
injunctive relief.  In its interpretation of the Compact, it held 
that the Governor may remove Pievsky prior to the expiration of 
his term in 1999.  Pievsky filed a notice of appeal and a motion 
in the district court for a stay pending appeal.  The district 
court granted a stay prohibiting the Governor from removing 
Pievsky pending resolution of an appeal to this Court.  We 
vacated the district court's grant of a stay pending appeal.  
Thereafter, Pievsky was removed by the Governor as a DRPA 
Commissioner.  Pievsky appealed to the Supreme Court for a stay 
preventing his removal from office.  The application was denied.  
The matter is now before us on Pievsky's appeal of the district 
court's order denying his application for a declaratory judgment 
and injunctive relief reinstating him to the position of 
commissioner of the DRPA.  
 
                               IV. 
     The issue we must decide is strictly one of statutory 
construction.  Does the DRPA Compact allow the Governor of 
Pennsylvania to remove a commissioner to the DRPA at will and 
prior to the expiration of his term?  
 
                                A. 
     Since the Compact is an interstate agreement which requires 
the consent of Congress, such Congressional consent transforms 
the Compact into an agreement pursuant to federal law.  SeeCuyler v. 
Adams, 449 U.S. 433, 438, 101 S. Ct. 703, 707 (1981); 
see also Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 
278, 79 S.Ct. 785, 788 (1959); Delaware River Joint Toll Bridge 
Comm'n v. Colburn, 310 U.S. 419, 427, 60 S. Ct. 1039, 1041 
(1940).  Our interpretation of the terms and conditions of the 
Compact is, therefore, governed by federal law.  See Cuyler, 449 
U.S. at 438, 101 S. Ct. at 707; see also Petty, 359 U.S. at 278, 
79 S. Ct. at 788.   
     Though state law is not binding, federal courts show 
deference to prior state adjudications and rulings in construing 
an interstate compact.  See State ex. rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 
22, 28, 71 S. Ct. 557, 560 (1951) ("To determine the nature and 
scope of obligations as between States [when] they arise through 
the legislative mean of compact . . . is the function and duty of 
the Supreme Court of the Nation.  Of course every deference will 
be shown to what the highest court of a State deems to be the law 
and policy of its State . . .");  see also Petty, 359 U.S. at 
278, n.4, 79 S. Ct at 788, n. 4 ("While we show deference to 
state law in construing a compact, state law as pronounced in 
prior adjudications and rulings is not binding"); Seattle Master 
Builders Ass'n v. Pacific N.W. Elec. Power & Conserv. Planning 
Council, 786 F.2d 1359, 1365 (9th Cir. 1986), cert. denied, 479 
U.S. 1059, 107 S. Ct. 939 (1987) ("While congressional consent 
gives an interstate compact some attributes of federal law, the 
Council members' appointment, salaries, and administrative 
operations are pursuant to the laws of the four individual 
states, within parameters set by the Act."). 
 
                                B. 
     The Compact is merely an agreement between states that has 
received the imprimatur of Congress.  The interpretation of the 
Compact must be grounded and based upon the very language of the 
instrument.  See Texas v. New Mexico, 482 U.S. 124, 128, 107 S. 
Ct. 2279, 2283 (1987).  The Compact between Pennsylvania and New 
Jersey states that "[s]ix of the eight commissioners for the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania shall be appointed by the Governor 
of Pennsylvania for terms of five years."  DRPA Compact, Article 
II, 36 P.S. § 3503.  It does not explicitly state whether the 
commissioners may be removed by the governor prior to the 
expiration of their term.   
     The long-standing rule in the context of federal 
appointments is that "[i]n the absence of specific provision to 
the contrary, the power of removal from office is incident to the 
power of appointment."  Keim v. United States, 177 U.S. 290, 293, 
20 S. Ct. 574, 575 (1900); accord Myers v. United States, 272 
U.S. 52, 161, 47 S. Ct. 21, 40 (1926);  see also Kalaris v. 
Donovan, 697 F.2d 376, 389 & n. 54 (D.C. Cir.) cert. denied, 462 
U.S. 1119 (1983) (quoting Cafeteria & Restaurant Workers Union v. 
McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 896, 81 S. Ct. 1743, 1749 (1961)).  
Pennsylvania has also adopted this principle of law.  SeeAmerican Fed'n of 
State, County, and Mun. Employees v. Shapp, 280 
A.2d 375, 377 (1971); see also Commonwealth ex. rel. Haymaker v. 
Black, 50 A. 1009 (1902).  The Compact explicitly gives the 
Governor of Pennsylvania the power to appoint six commissioners 
to the DRPA.  Accordingly, pursuant to federal law, there is a 
presumption that the Governor also has the authority to remove 
those six commissioners prior to the end of their terms. 
     Pievsky argues that since the DRPA Commissioner's term of 
office is five years, as compared to the Governor's four year 
term of office, the Pennsylvania legislature and Congress 
intended to limit the Governor's power of removal.  We disagree.  
The fact that the Governor's term of office is shorter than that 
of the commissioners does not indicate an intent on the part of 
the legislature to limit the Governor's ability to remove his 
appointees.  If the Pennsylvania legislature intended such a 
limitation, it would have stated so in the Compact.  Instead, the 
Compact simply reads that the Governor of Pennsylvania shall 
appoint a DRPA Commissioner for a term of five years.  Since the 
power to remove is incident to the power to appoint, we hold that 
under the terms of the Compact the Governor of Pennsylvania has 
the authority to remove a DRPA Commissioner at will.   
     We believe that the difference in the length of terms of 
office is irrelevant.  Since the Compact provides that 
commissioners may hold office after the expiration of the term 
for which they are appointed, and "no period during which any 
commissioner shall hold over shall be deemed to be an extension 
of this term of office for the purpose of computing the date on 
which his successor's term expires,"  DRPA Compact, Article II, 
36 P.S. § 3503, a commissioner's term of office may in fact be 
for four years or less.  This would occur if a commissioner is 
succeeding a prior commissioner who has continued to hold office 
after the expiration of his term of office. 
     Pievsky also contends that interpreting the Compact to 
permit the Governor to remove a commissioner at will vitiates the 
plain language of the Compact which provides that six of the 
Commonwealth's commissioners "shall be appointed by the Governor 
of Pennsylvania for terms of five years."  He asserts that five 
years means five years, and not less than five years.  We are not 
persuaded.  It is a long-standing rule in the federal courts that 
a fixed term merely provides a time for the term to end.  The 
fixed term is merely a "cap" with the appointee removable at 
will.  See Parsons v. United States, 167 U.S. 324, 17 S. Ct. 880 
(1897).  We read the term "five years" as a means of limiting the 
length of the term of office, not as a prohibition on the 
Governor's removal authority. 
      
                                C. 
     Pievsky next maintains that under federal law the terms of 
the DRPA Compact evidence an intent by the legislatures to limit 
the Governor's removal power because the Compact states that six 
of Pennsylvania's commissioners "shall be appointed by the 
Governor . . . for terms of five years."  Compact art. II.  The 
case law cited by Pievsky in support of his argument are readily 
distinguishable.  In Humphrey's Executor v. United States, 295 
U.S. 602, 55 S. Ct. 869 (1935), the Supreme Court reviewed 
President Roosevelt's attempt to remove a member of the Federal 
Trade Commission ("FTC").  Pursuant to the Federal Trade 
Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 41, 42, commissioners of the FTC 
were appointed for fixed rotating terms.  The Federal Trade 
Commission Act provides that "[a]ny commissioner may be removed 
by the President for inefficiency, neglect of duty, or 
malfeasance in office."  15 U.S.C. § 41.  The Supreme Court held 
that in light of the statutory language limiting removal, "the 
fixing of a definite term subject to removal for cause, unless 
there be some countervailing provision or circumstance indicating 
the contrary, which here we are unable to find, is enough to 
establish the legislative intent that the term is not to be 
curtailed in the absence of such cause."  Humphrey's Executor, 
295 U.S. at 624, 55 S. Ct. at 872.  The statute at issue in 
Humphrey's Executor contained clear language limiting the removal 
authority of the President -- such language is absent from the 
Compact. 
     Moreover, the Supreme Court in Humphrey's Executorconsidered the 
character of the commission as an essential basis 
for its holding.  The Court determined that the FTC was a 
nonpartisan body, charged "with the enforcement of no policy 
except the policy of the law", and that "[i]ts duties are neither 
political nor executive, but predominantly quasi judicial and 
quasi legislative."  295 U.S. at 624, 55 S. Ct. at 872.  The 
Humphrey's Executor court noted that 
     [I]t is quite evident that one who holds his office only 
     during the pleasure of another, cannot be depended upon to 
     maintain an attitude of independence against the latter's 
     will.   
 
295 U.S. at 629, 55 S. Ct. at 874.  Accordingly, the Humphrey's 
Executor Court concluded that the President did not have the 
authority to remove a member of the FTC prior to the expiration 
of that member's term of office for reasons in addition to those 
specifically stated in the statute.  In contrast, the DRPA is 
neither a quasi legislative or quasi judicial body.  Also, in 
contrast to the character of the FTC, the DRPA is a politically 
sensitive body that must be responsive to the programs and 
policies of the administration presently in office. 
     We have previously discussed how the DRPA officers must be 
politically accountable in Peters v. Delaware River Port 
Authority, 16 F.3d 1346, 1354-55 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 115 S. 
Ct. 62 (1994).  In Peters, the Secretary of the DRPA brought suit 
claiming that the DRPA infringed his constitutional rights of 
free speech and association by failing to reappoint him as its 
Secretary solely because he was a member of the New Jersey 
Republican Party.  We rejected his claim, finding that party 
affiliation of the officers of the DRPA was relevant to the 
effective functioning of the DRPA.  We stated,  
     The DRPA has broad powers, leaving much room for principled 
     disagreement on policy goals or their implementation.   
 
                              . . . 
 
     The policy and political issues, including economic 
     considerations, arising in an entity such as the DRPA are 
     many.  If tolls are raised, bridges fall into disrepair, or 
     traffic is congested, there are surely political 
     consequences.  Whether decent roads and transit systems will 
     be made available to all segments of the communities, or 
     will be provided in a manner perceived as favoring some or 
     excluding others, raises important and sensitive social, 
     economic and political questions. . . . Since the governors 
     of New Jersey and Pennsylvania directly appoint fourteen of 
     the sixteen member Board of Commissioners, political 
     responsibility for the DRPA's successes and failures can be 
     expected to fall on the ruling administration of each state.  
      
 
                              . . . 
 
     Obviously, the party affiliation or policy views of the 
     officers in the DRPA could be relevant to the effective 
     presentation and implementation of particular policy goals.  
     If the states preferred huge increases in spending for the 
     construction of bridges, for example, they might 
     legitimately prefer that high positions in the DRPA not be 
     filled with individuals belonging to a party which advocates 
     decreased government spending.  
 
16 F.3d at 1355.  Therefore, the DRPA Commissioners must be 
accountable to the administration in office in order for the DRPA 
to function properly.   
     The goals of each state are accomplished only through the 
DRPA's responsiveness to each state.  In order to ensure such 
responsiveness, the Governor must have the authority to remove 
Pennsylvania's appointed commissioners.  The fact that 
Pennsylvania's representation on the Commission is comprised 
exclusively of Executive Department appointees and officials 
lends support to the conclusion that the DRPA is meant to be 
responsive to the Executive Branch of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania.  Six of Pennsylvania's eight commissioners are 
appointed by the governor, and the remaining two members who 
serve ex-officio are the State Treasurer and the Auditor General, 
both of whom are officers of the Executive Department.  Compact 
art. II; 36 P.S. § 3503.  The ability of the Governor to remove 
DRPA Commissioners ensures that the commissioners are politically 
accountable to each state's administration.  This case is clearly 
distinguishable from the Supreme Court's holding in Humphrey's 
Executive. 
     The facts underlying Wiener v. United States, 357 U.S. 349, 
78 S. Ct. 1275 (1958) are also distinguishable.  In Wiener,  the 
Supreme Court reviewed President Eisenhower's attempt to remove a 
member of the War Claims Commission ("WCC").  Congress 
established the WCC to adjudicate claims by United States 
citizens against Japan as a result of World War II.  The statute 
was silent with regard to the removal of members of the WCC.  It 
provided that the commissioners' terms would expire 
simultaneously with the life of the Commission.  The Supreme 
Court concluded that the adjudicatory nature of the task imposed 
by Congress on the WCC lead to the conclusion that Congress did 
not leave room for the President to remove members and replace 
them with individuals of his own choosing.  The Court stated,  
     If, as one must take for granted, the War Claims Act 
     precluded the President from influencing the Commission in 
     passing on a particular claim, a fortiori, it must be 
     inferred that Congress did not wish to have hang over the 
     Commission the Damocles' sword of removal by the President 
     for no reason other than that he preferred to have on that 
     Commission men of his own choosing.    
 
Wiener, 357 U.S. at 356, 78 S. Ct. at 1279.  Here, the DRPA does 
not perform any tasks that may be classified as adjudicatory.  In 
contrast to the WCC, the Compact between Pennsylvania and New 
Jersey envisions that the administration of each state would 
influence the DRPA in deciding which policies to implement and 
which goals to pursue. 
     We also find that Borders v. Reagan, 518 F. Supp. 250 (D. 
D.C. 1981), order vacated as moot, 732 F.2d 181 (D.C. Cir. 1982), 
is distinguishable.  In Borders, the district court held that 
President Reagan could not remove at will a member of the 
District of Columbia Judicial Nominating Commission that 
President Carter had appointed.  The District of Columbia Self- 
Government and Governmental Reorganization Act ("Act") provides 
that the Commission would consist of seven members who "shall 
serve" for terms of six years, except for the member appointed by 
the President who "shall serve" for a term of five.  11 D.C.Code 
App. § 434 (Supp. IV 1977).  The Act made no provision for the 
removal of commission members.   
     The district court in Borders held the language of the 
statute made clear that Congress did not intend a member of the 
commission would serve only at the pleasure of the appointing 
authority; rather, once an appointment was made it anticipated 
that the member would serve a complete term.  The plain language 
of the Act provides that a member "shall serve" for the term of 
years.  The Act makes no provision for the removal of a member, 
but does provide for the appointment of a member when a vacancy 
occurs.  The district court noted that the Act contemplated that 
vacancies would occur only at the expiration of a given term:  
The Act provides that for vacancies occurring "other than [upon] 
the expiration of a prior term," the new member would serve only 
for the "remainder of the unexpired term of his predecessor."  
Act at § 434(b)(2).  Thus, even if Borders were binding on us, 
the district court's conclusion in that matter that Congress did 
not intend a commissioner to be removed at will is 
distinguishable.    
     The plain language of the DRPA Compact does not indicate, as 
the language of the statute in Borders did, that the state 
legislatures contemplated vacancies on the DRPA Board would occur 
only at the expiration of DRPA members' expired terms.  Moreover, 
the court's decision in Borders rested on additional grounds that 
are not present in this case.  The Act provided for staggered 
terms for six of the commissioners, which the court determined 
was evidence of Congressional intent that the members be isolated 
from political considerations and political changes.  
     Pievsky also asserts that the DRPA is an interstate entity 
which is not under the control of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania or the State of New Jersey.  He cites Hess v. Port 
Authority Trans-Hudson Corp., __ U.S. __, 115 S. Ct. 394 (1994), 
for the proposition that "[b]ecause Compact Clause entities owe 
their existence to state and federal sovereigns acting 
cooperatively, and not to any 'one of the United States,'...their 
political accountability is diffuse; they lack the tight tie to 
the people of one State that an instrument of a single State 
has."  115 S. Ct. at 401.  We agree that the DRPA is not under 
the control of any one state.  As we stated in Peters the DRPA is 
"not designed to further the political agenda of any one state or 
administration."  Peters, 16 F.3d at 1355.  Nevertheless, 
pursuant to the appointing process, Pennsylvania-appointed DRPA 
officials are under the control of the Pennsylvania Governor, 
just as New Jersey-appointed DRPA Commissioners must be 
politically accountable to the Governor of New Jersey. 
 
                                D. 
     As previously discussed, in Humphrey's Executor the Supreme 
Court stated "the power of the President to remove an officer 
shall prevail over the authority of Congress to condition the 
power by fixing a definite term and precluding a removal except 
for cause will depend upon the character of the office."  295 
U.S. at 631-32, 55 S. Ct. at 875.  In Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 
654, 108 S. Ct. 2597 (1988), the Supreme Court clarified the 
meaning of the "character of the office" inquiry that courts must 
undertake in assessing whether Congress has impermissibly 
restricted the executive branch's authority to remove an 
appointed official.  The Morrison Court was faced with the 
question of whether the provisions of the Ethics in Government 
Act impermissibly restricted the Attorney General's ability to 
remove the independent counsel.  The Court stated that the 
legitimacy of congressional limitations on the chief executive's 
powers of removal turns upon "whether the removal restrictions 
are of such a nature that they impede the President's ability to 
perform his constitutional duty, and the functions of the 
officials in question must be analyzed in that light."  Id. at 
690-91, 108 S. Ct. at 2619.   
     The Morrison Court went on to hold that the Act did not 
impermissibly interfere with the President's ability to perform 
his constitutional duty because, though the President could not 
remove the independent counsel at will, the statute provided that 
the President, through the Attorney General, could remove the 
independent counselor for good cause.  The Supreme Court reasoned 
that this ability gives the President "ample authority to assure 
that the counsel is competently performing his or her statutory 
responsibilities . . . ."  Id. at 692, 108 S. Ct. at 2620. 
     Pievsky's case is distinguishable from Morrison because the 
"character of office" analysis is based on a separation of powers 
inquiry which is not at issue here; and in any event, here, the 
Governor's inability to remove DRPA Commissioners prior to the 
expiration of their terms would impede his ability to carry out 
his functions as Chief Executive of the Commonwealth of 
Pennsylvania.  As Governor, the defendant in this case is charged 
with ensuring that the laws of the state are "faithfully 
executed."  Pa. Const. art. II, § 2.  The Governor's obligation 
to ensure the proper functioning of the DRPA is one of the duties 
charged to him pursuant to the Commonwealth's Constitution.  
Moreover, The Pennsylvania Constitution states: 
     All civil officers shall hold their offices on the condition 
     that they behave themselves well while in office, and shall 
     be removed on conviction of misbehavior in office or of any 
     infamous crime.  Appointed civil officers, other than the 
     judges of the courts of record, may be removed at the 
     pleasure of the power by which they shall have been 
     appointed. 
 
Pa. Const. art. VI, § 7.  Pievsky is neither a "judge of the 
courts of record," nor "a civil officer elected by the people."  
Absent language in the Compact to the contrary, which we do not 
find, the Governor's constitutional duty includes removing 
appointed officials at his pleasure.  Because the Compact does 
not limit the Governor's removal power, the Governor may exercise 
his power under the Pennsylvania Constitution to remove appointed 
officials to the DRPA Board.  We agree with Pievsky's contention 
that the Compact is in the nature of federal law, and, under the 
Supremacy Clause of the U.S. Constitution, could limit the 
Governor's ability to remove his appointed officials.  However, 
as discussed above, we conclude under a federal law analysis that 
the legislatures which passed the Compact did not intend to 
restrict the Governor's ability to remove DRPA Commissioners in 
this manner. 
     The appointed members of the DRPA are "policy makers" who 
exercise executive powers and are expected to carry out the 
policies of the current administration of each state; they are 
not comparable to the commissioners of the FTC, the commissioners 
of the WCC, or the independent counsel in Morrison.  Far from 
needing independent appointees, "the DRPA needs officers who are 
capable of efficiently, effectively, and loyally accessing the 
political channels that influence the DRPA's agenda and 
direction."  Peters, 16 F.3d at 1356.  Considering the mission of 
the DRPA, and the burden that inter-state conflicts place on the 
effective functioning of this bi-state authority, the 
legislatures could not have intended to create a board on which 
Pennsylvania's members are independent of the current Governor. 
 
                                E. 
     Though state law is not binding, federal courts show 
deference to prior state adjudications and rulings in construing 
an interstate compact.  See State ex. rel. Dyer v. Sims, 341 U.S. 
22, 28, 71 S. Ct. 557, 560 (1951).  Pennsylvania law is in accord 
with federal law that the Pennsylvania Governor may remove a DRPA 
commissioner at will and prior to the expiration of the term.  
The removal of state officers in Pennsylvania is governed by the 
Commonwealth's Constitution which provides that "[a]ppointed 
civil officers, other than the judges of the courts of record, 
may be removed at the pleasure of the power by which they shall 
have been appointed."  Pa. Const. art. VI, § 7.  In the absence 
of statutory language providing otherwise this constitutional 
provision governs the removal of appointed officials.  Watson v. 
Pennsylvania Turnpike Comm'n, 125 A.2d 354, 356-57 (Pa. 1956).  
The legislature may "impose such terms and limitations with 
reference to the tenure and removal of an incumbent [state 
official] as it sees fit."  Id. at 356.   
     The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that where a statute 
provides for fixed terms with staggered expiration dates, the 
legislature intended that those appointed shall not be removable 
at the will of the appointing authority.  Id. at 356-57; see 
alsoCommonwealth ex. rel. Sortino v. Singley, 392 A.2d 1337 (Pa. 
1978); Bowers v. Pennsylvania Labor Relations Bd., 167 A.2d 480, 
484-85 (Pa. 1961); Commonwealth ex. rel. Hanson v. Reitz, 170 
A.2d 111 (Pa. 1961).  However, the mere fixing of a definite term 
does not override the dictates of Article VI, § 7 of the 
Constitution which gives removal power to the appointing 
authority.  See Schluraff v. Rzymek, 208 A.2d 239 (Pa. 1965) 
(plaintiff appointed to fixed term removable at-will); see alsoNaef v. 
City of Allentown, 227 A.2d 888, 890-891 (Pa. 
1967)(plaintiff appointed to fixed term of four years removable 
at-will; "solicitor is an important confidant . . . in the 
administration of the city's business.  To hold that one who is 
unacceptable must be retained in such a position would lead to a 
seriously disturbed municipal situation."); Commonwealth ex. rel. 
Schofield v. Lindsay, 198 A. 635 (Pa. 1938).  Pennsylvania case 
law provides that the staggering of terms, not the mere fixing of 
a definite term in office, bars the Governor from removing an 
appointed official at will.  See Naef, 227 A.2d at 890; see alsoSchluraff, 
208 A.2d at 239.  Therefore, in light of the fact that 
the DRPA Commissioners' terms are fixed and not staggered, the 
Pennsylvania Constitution, as interpreted by the Pennsylvania 
Supreme Court, does not preclude the Governor from removing 
Pievsky prior to the expiration of his term. 
     We note that the Pennsylvania Attorney General has 
officially opined that Pennsylvania's appointees to the DRPA are 
removable at will.  See Pennsylvania Attorney General's Official 
Opinion, No. 280 issued on March 24, 1939 at 1939-40.  Article 
VI, Section 4 was renumbered as Article VI, Section 7 in 1966.  
Pennsylvania courts and state agencies accord deference to the 
formal opinions of Pennsylvania's Attorney General on matters of 
statutory interpretation.  Baird v. Township of New Britain, 633 
A.2d 225, 229 n. 7 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1993), allocatur denied, 642 
A.2d 488 (1994); see also Schell v. Eastern York Sch. Dist., 500 
A.2d 896 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1985).  We note that the Attorney 
General of New Jersey has also issued an opinion that the 
Pennsylvania appointees to the DRPA Board are removable at will 
by the Governor of Pennsylvania.  Def.'s Supplemental Appendix, 
Memorandum from Attorney General George F. Kugler, Jr. to 
Governor William T. Cahill, October 6, 1971.  We need not decide 
the extent of deference due in this situation in light of all the 
other convincing bases for our conclusion that by reason of the 
state constitutional provisions governing the removal of 
appointed officials, and given that the DRPA commissioners' terms 
are fixed and not staggered, the Governor has the power to remove 
appointed DRPA Commissioners at will.    
 
                               V.  
     For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Governor of 
Pennsylvania has the power to remove an appointed DRPA 
Commissioner at will and prior to the expiration of the term.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the order of the district court 
entered on April 12, 1996.  Each party to bear its own costs. 
 
                           
 
